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1.  CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Introduction  
Credit has an important role in the free market as it allows persons without capital to freely 
participate in the economy with those who have capital. Therefore, credit grants access to 
developing wealth, regardless of one’s financial status.1 The lack of such access to credit may 
potentially exclude persons from the economy and for this reason free market-based democracies 
oppose credit discrimination by means of implementing suitable legislation.2 It is a fact that the 
empowering role of credit towards consumers stimulates economic growth. However, this 
growth must not be at the expense of household savings or household financial health. 3 
Regulating the credit market extensively may prevent any abuse from unscrupulous credit 
providers who might exploit consumers.4 The government is of the opinion that a working credit 
market will benefit consumers by guiding consumers to accrue assets, participate in economic 
opportunities and establish their own trade or business.5  
An increase in debts or credit increases the household debt-to-disposable income ratio and the 
number of impaired records. This, in turn, places an unfavorable burden on unsuspecting families 
in such a way that they cannot escape the debt dependence circle.6 The number of impaired credit 
records was estimated to be at 45% during June 2014, at the end of March 2017 this number 
decreased to 39.3%.7 During the 2014 financial year the South African Reserve Bank conducted 
a study which concluded that the household debt to disposable income was 74.5%, this is an 
improvement from the 83%  recorded in the third quarter of 2009. In December 2017, this ratio 
                                               
1 De Wet, Botha & Booyens “Measuring the effect of the National Credit Act on indebtedness in South Africa” 2015 
Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences 83 85.  
2 De Wet, Botha & Booyens (n 1) 83.   
3 De Wet, Botha & Booyens (n 1) 84.  
4  Stoop “South African consumer credit policy: Measures indirectly aimed at preventing consumer over-
indebtedness” 2009 SA MERC LJ 365 368.  
5 Department of Trade and Industry South Africa “Consumer Credit Law Reform: Policy Framework for 
Consumer Credit” 2004 Policy Framework http:// www.thedti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/policyjune2005.pdf  (08-12-
2018).  
6 De Wet, Botha & Booyens (n 1) 84. 
7 National Credit Regulator “The annual report 2016/17” https://www.thedti.gov.za/parliament/2017/NCR AR 
2017.pdf (09-11-2018) 1 43. 
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was at 71,9%.8 This improvement is due to the implementation of some economic measures 
preventing reckless credit and over-indebtedness such as the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
(hereinafter referred to as the “NCA”), the Affordability Assessment Regulations, 9  and the 
National Credit Amendment Act. 10  The mentioned laws protect the consumer by making it 
compulsory for the credit provider to perform a pre-agreement assessment with the consumer 
before they extend credit or increase their credit limit.  
The scope of the Dissertation  
The National Credit Act was enacted to prevent over-indebtedness and reckless credit. This study 
will explore the statutory duty imposed on the credit provider to prevent and possibly eradicate 
the granting of reckless credit which causes consumers to become over-indebted in terms of the 
NCA. Consideration will be given to the development of the concept of reckless credit and over- 
indebtedness as consumer protection methods. This will be done by firstly, examining the 
historical trends and developments of consumer credit legislation in South Africa. Secondly, the 
provisions of reckless credit and over-indebtedness in terms of the National Credit Act will be 
evaluated by focusing on the following: what constitutes as reckless credit; how the pre-
agreement assessment should be conducted by the credit provider; the types of reckless credit 
agreements and remedies available to consumers when credit is granted recklessly. Lastly, this 
study will evaluate the reckless credit provisions in the National Credit Amendment Bill, 2017 
and assess if the proposed changes will extend adequate protection to consumers against reckless 
credit.  
1.2 History of national credit legislation in South Africa  
1.2.1 History of credit legislation before 2005  
Before consumer protection was codified by way of legislation reference was always made to 
Roman-Dutch law sources, Roman law sources and other available ancient sources. 11 These 
societies had extensive rules to protect their citizens from any exploitation and includes, for 
                                               
8 National Credit Regulator (n 7) 43. 
9 Government Gazette No 38557 (13-03-2015). 
10 National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014.  
11 Otto “The history of consumer credit legislation in South Africa” 2010 Fundamina 257 
258.  
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example, the warranty against latent defects, the in duplum rule and many others.12 Consumers 
protected by way of common law rules which have been developed over time must also be 
protected by legislation, as it is easily accessible and suitable for the needs of a modern society.13  
The first legislation dealing with consumer protection in South Africa was the Usury Act 37 of 
1926.14 The purpose of this Act was to curb and prohibit usurious conduct by credit providers. 
The basis for the prohibition of usurious conduct is also stated in Deuteronomy 23:19 which 
provides that:   
“Thou shall not lend usury to thy brother, usury of money, usury of victuals, usury of 
anything that is lent upon usury.” 15  
For many centuries usury had been the most prohibited form of commercial trading. Usury laws 
were also codified in the Codes of Hammurabi, which expressly provided the interest rates to be 
charged to consumers in credit agreements, to prevent usury.16 
The Usury Act of 1926 was replaced by the Limitation and Disclosures of Finance Charges Act  
73 of 1968. The purpose of this act was to limit and compel the disclosure of financial charges. 
Furthermore, this act also provides for a closed list of amounts to be charged by the credit 
provider in a credit agreement.17 In 1986 the legislature amended and renamed the Limitation 
and Disclosures of Finance Charges Act to the Usury Act 42 of 1986. During this time the Credit 
Agreements Act 75 of 1980 was also enacted, with the belief that these acts would co-exist to 
extensively govern consumer credit protection.18 While the Usury Act of 1986 curbed usurious 
conduct the Credit Agreements Act governed the contractual aspects of credit agreements 
regarding the sale and lease of any movable property.19 The co-existence of these two acts made 
                                               
12 Otto (n 11) 258. 
13 Otto (n 11) 259. 
14 Otto (n 11) 261.  
15 Deuteronomy 23:19 of the Holy Bible 
and Kelly-Louw and Stoop Consumer 
Credit Regulation in South Africa (2012) 
7. 
16 Kelly-Louw and Stoop (n 15) 7 and Otto (n 11) 261. 
17 Tucker “The limitation and disclosures of Finance Charges Act” 1980 De Rebus 581 585. 
18 Otto (n 11) 266. 
19 Otto (n 11) 267. 
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regulating the consumer credit market even more difficult as some provisions conflicted with 
each other.20  
During 1990 the South African Law Commission undertook an evaluation into the credit and 
consumer market in South Africa, this evaluation was concluded in 1993.21 It was only in 2002 
when the Department of Trade and Industry set up the technical committee, which had to assess 
the credit market in South Africa. This committee reviewed the shortcomings of all legislation 
enacted up to that point, namely the Usury Act 1926, Limitations and Disclosure of Finance 
Charges Act and other legislation and regulations. 22  This review established that the South 
African credit market was seriously compromised in that there were high levels of consumer 
over- indebtedness, high costs of credit and the majority of consumers did not have access to 
credit.23 As a result of these shortcomings the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 was enacted and 
became fully operational in stages between 1 June 2006 and 1 July 2007.24  
1.2.2 History of consumer legislation after 2005  
The NCA introduced new concepts to consumer protection, namely reckless credit and over-
indebtedness. Reckless credit is defined as an instance where the credit provider during the time 
of concluding a credit agreement with the consumer or credit limit of the consumer on an 
existing credit agreement:  
• did not conduct the pre-agreement assessment;  
• extended credit to the consumer who did not understand the risks, costs, and 
rights and obligations attached to that credit agreement; or  
• extending credit to that consumer would make the consumer over-indebted.25  
Over-indebtedness is defined as a situation where the consumer cannot satisfy in a timely manner 
all the obligations under all the credit agreements to which the consumer is bound, considering 
                                               
20 Otto (n 11) 266.  
21 Otto (n 11) 269. 
22 Otto (n 11) 266. 
23 De Wet, Botha & Booyens (n 1) 84. 
24 Kelly-Louw and Stoop (n 15) 18 19. 
25 Section 80 of the NCA.  
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that consumer's financial means, prospects and obligations, and their probable propensity to 
satisfy in a timely manner all their obligations under all the credit agreements.26  
These provisions apply to natural persons in the credit agreement which fall within the scope of 
the NCA.27 These aspects are governed by sections 78-88 of the NCA and place a duty on the 
credit provider to conduct a pre-agreement assessment before extending credit to the consumer.  
A pre-agreement assessment as required by section 81(2) of the NCA, is a compulsory 
assessment which must be conducted by the credit provider before concluding a credit agreement 
with a consumer.28  
Section 82(1) of the NCA provides that the credit provider is free to determine their evaluative 
methods and procedures to be used in conducting the pre-agreement assessment under section 
81.29 This provision was ineffective in preventing reckless credit as the number of over-indebted 
consumers increased steadily. This was because the assessment methods used by some credit 
providers were not extensive enough to test the creditworthiness of the consumer.30 
During 2012 the Minister of Finance together with other stakeholders established guidelines 
which can be used by credit providers to measure the creditworthiness of their consumers before 
extending credit.31 During May 2013 the National Credit Regulator released a public notice of 
the affordability guidelines, these guidelines proposed a way by which credit providers have to 
conduct the pre-agreement assessment. 32  In September 2013 the National Credit Regulator 
released another draft to the affordability guidelines which were more comprehensive than those 
released during May 2013. These guidelines would apply to all credit providers and all credit 
agreements governed by the NCA.33   
                                               
26 Section 79(1) of the NCA.  
27 Otto (n 11) 271. 
28 Section 81(2) of the NCA.  
29 Otto (n 11) 272.  
30 Scholtz et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) par 11.5.1. 
31 Scholtz et al (n 30) par 11.5.6. 
32 Scholtz et al (n 30) par 11.5.6. 
33 Scholtz et al (n 30) par 11.5.6. 
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The first draft regulations were published on the 1st of August 2014 for public commentary and 
dealt with several issues, including the affordability assessment regulations.34 The Minister of 
Trade and Industry in an attempt to ensure that the credit provider conducts an extensive 
assessment into their consumer’s financial position enacted the final draft to the affordability 
assessment regulations. These regulations come into effect on 13 March 2015, however, in order 
to allow the credit providers to adjust their business, these regulations only became effective on  
the 14 September 2015.35 These regulations would only apply to credit agreements governed by 
the NCA and concluded by natural persons.36 The National Credit Amendment Act amended 
sections 82(1) of the NCA to provide that a credit provider may determine for itself the 
evaluative mechanisms or models and procedures to be used in meeting its assessment 
obligations under section 81. These mechanisms, models or procedures must result in a fair and 
objective assessment, and “must not be inconsistent with the affordability assessment 
regulations” made by the Minister”.37  
The purpose of these regulations is to ensure that there is an objective and fair criterion for 
evaluating the financial position of the consumer to prevent over-indebting consumers.38 These 
regulations do not prevent the credit provider from using their own evaluation methods, however, 
these should not be inconsistent with the regulation as prescribed by the minister. Furthermore, 
the credit provider’s determined assessment or evaluation methods should be fair and objective.39   
2. CHAPTER TWO: RECKLESS CREDIT IN TERMS OF THE NATIONAL CREDIT  
ACT 34 OF 2005  
2.1 Reckless credit in terms of the National Credit Act  
A credit agreement in terms of section  8(1) of the NCA is a credit agreement in terms of the 
NCA if it is a credit facility, a credit transaction, credit guarantee or any combination of these 
three transactions.40 Section 80(1) of the NCA provides that a credit agreement is reckless if at 
                                               
34 Scholtz et al (n 30) par 11.5.6. 
35 Scholtz et al (n 30) par 11.5.6.  
36 Scholtz et al (n 30) par 11.5.6. 
37 Section 24 of the National Credit Amendment Act.  
38 Scholtz et al (n 30) par 11.5.6. 
39 Scholtz et al (n 30) par 11.5.6.   
40 Otto and Otto The National Credit Act Explained (2015) 22. 
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the time that the agreement was concluded, or at the time where the amount in terms of the 
agreement is increased, the credit provider: 41    
• failed to conduct an assessment into the financial position of the consumer; or   
• entered into a credit agreement despite the fact that the information available at 
the time indicated that the consumer did not generally understand or appreciate 
the consumer’s risks, costs or obligations under the proposed credit agreement; 
and  
• entered into the credit agreement with the consumer despite the fact that the 
preponderance of the information available to the credit provider indicated that 
entering into the credit agreement would make the consumer over-indebted.   
The Oxford English dictionary defines the word reckless as “without thought or care for the 
results of an action”.42 Thus, reckless credit providers can be said to have no care or any thought 
to the financial well-being of their consumers when extending credit to them, and whether the 
proposed agreement will over-indebt them or not. Sections 81 and 82 of the NCA read together 
state how a credit provider may prevent extending credit recklessly, by conducting an assessment 
to determine whether a consumer can afford the credit or extension.43  
Over-indebtedness and reckless credit are concepts of consumer legislation governed by Part D 
of chapter 4 of the NCA.44 Although in most instances the concepts of over-indebtedness and 
reckless credit are used interchangeably, they are distinct. These concepts may, however, 
intersect where reckless credit causes a consumer to become over-indebted.45 This intersect will 
occur where the credit provider conducts the pre-agreement assessment and concludes a credit 
                                               
41 Section 80(1) of the NCA and Otto and Otto (n 40) 22. 
42 Hawker Oxford English Dictionary (2006) 575.  
43 Kelly-Louw “A credit provider’s complete defence against a consumer’s allegation of reckless lending” 2014 SA 
MERC LJ 24 36 and Otto and Otto (n 40) 22. 
44 Scholtz et al (n 30) par 11.1 and Otto and Otto (n 40) 22 
45 Kelly-Louw (n 43) 36. 
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agreement with the consumer despite the information available during the assessment indicating 
that the consumer will become over-indebted by the credit agreement.46  
2.2 The purpose of reckless credit provisions  
The purpose of reckless credit provisions is to deter credit providers from entering into credit 
agreements without first conducting the pre-agreement assessment to establish whether the 
consumer understands the risks and implications of that agreement, and the consumer can afford 
the proposed credit.47 The consequences for non-compliance with these provisions are enforced 
by punishing reckless credit providers in terms of section 83 of the NCA, which will be 
discussed later.   
This assessment extends to cases where the credit provider wants to give an existing consumer a 
credit increase in their credit facility or any other credit agreements. If this is the case, then a 
second pre-agreement assessment is to be conducted by that credit provider. The purpose is to 
evaluate the consumer’s current financial position to establish whether that consumer would be 
able to afford the new credit increase.48 Failure to conduct this new pre-agreement assessment 
renders the new credit agreement or credit extension reckless.49  
2.3 Scope of application  
The provisions dealing with reckless credit in the NCA and the Affordability Assessment  
Regulations apply to the extent that the credit agreement is governed by the National Credit Act.  
These are credit agreements concluded by parties after 1 June 2007 dealing at arm’s length and 
made in or having an effect within South Africa.50 These provisions would not apply to credit 
agreements not governed by the NCA, hence consumers who concluded credit agreements falling 
                                               
46 Van Heerden and Steennot “Pre-agreement assessment as a responsible lending tool in South Africa, the EU and 
Belgium: Part 1” 2018 PERLJ 1 2. 
47 Scholtz et al (n 30). 
48 Van Heerden and Steennot “Pre-agreement assessment as a responsible lending tool in South Africa, the EU and 
Belgium: Part 2” 2018 PERLJ 1 15.   
49 Van Heerden and Steennot (n 48) 23.  
50 Section 4(1) of the NCA and Otto and Otto (n 40) 20. 
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outside the scope of the NCA and before 1 June 2007, will not be able to rely on the defence of 
reckless credit.51  
These provisions will also not apply to a credit agreement in terms of which a consumer is a 
juristic person.52 Section 78(1) of the NCA provides that chapter 4 part D does not apply to a 
credit agreement in respect of which the consumer is a juristic person.53 A juristic person in 
terms of section 1 of the NCA includes a partnership, association or other body of persons, 
corporate or unincorporated or a trust if there are three or more individual trustees or a trust is 
itself a juristic person. 54 This was confirmed in the case of Standard Bank of SA Limited v 
Coskey and Others55 where it was alleged that credit was extended recklessly as at the time of 
extending that credit the trust was over-indebted.56 The exclusion of juristic persons from these 
provisions do not amount to unfair and unreasonable discrimination, this was confirmed in the 
case of Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hunkydory Investments and Another 194 (Pty) Ltd.57 
The court, in this case, held that the discrimination was not unfair and the exclusion of juristic 
persons from the protection of the NCA was not unreasonable.58 
Furthermore, the provisions of reckless credit and the Affordability Assessment Regulations will 
not find application in the following credit agreements, even if such agreements were concluded 
after 1 June 2007:  
• a developmental credit agreement;  
• a school loan or a student loan;  
• a public interest credit agreement;  
• a pawn transaction;  
• an incidental credit agreement;  
                                               
51 Kelly-Louw (n 43) 24.  
52 Kelly-Louw (n 43) 25 and Otto and Otto (n 40) 35. 
53 Section 78(1) of the NCA and Kelly-Louw (n 43) 25. 
54 Section 1 of the NCA. 
55 Standard Bank of SA Limited v Coskey and Others case no 2015/64021 (ZAGPPHC)(unreported).  
56 Standard Bank of SA Limited v Coskey and Other (n 55) par 15.  
57 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hunkydory Investments and Another 194 (Pty) Ltd 2010 1 SA 627 (C). 
58 Ibid and Kelly-Louw and Stoop (n 15) 39. 
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• an emergency loan;  
• a temporary increase in the credit limit under a credit facility;  
• a unilateral credit limit increase in terms of sections 119(1)(c), 119(4) and 119(5) of the 
Act under a credit facility;  
• a pre-existing credit agreement in terms of Schedule 3 Item 4(2) of the Act;  
• any change to a credit agreement and/or any deferral or waiver of an amount under an 
existing credit agreement in accordance with section 95 of the Act; and  
• mortgage credit agreements that qualify for the Finance Linked Subsidy Programs 
developed by the Department of Human Settlements and credit advanced for housing that 
falls within the threshold set from time to time.59  
  
The scope of the excluded credit agreements in terms of section 78 of the NCA was expanded by 
regulation 23A(2) of the Affordability Assessment Regulations(Government Gazette No 38557). 
The credit providers in the above credit agreements still have to conclude a pre-agreement 
assessment into the financial position of the prospective consumers before extending credit. This 
is to prevent over-indebting a consumer as the provision remedying over-indebtedness will still 
be applicable in these agreements.60  
2.4 Duties of the consumer and credit provider  
The NCA places an obligation to prevent reckless credit on the consumer and the credit 
provider.61 The obligation placed on the consumer is stated in section 81(1) of the NCA, which 
states that the consumer during the pre-agreement assessment, must answer fully and truthfully 
any requests for information made by the credit provider, in conducting their assessment in terms 
of section 81(2) of the NCA. 62  This is further confirmed in Regulation 24A(6) of the 
Affordability Assessment Regulation, which provides that the consumer must accurately disclose 
to the credit provider all their financial obligations to enable the credit provider to conduct the 
                                               
59 Section 78(2) of the NCA and Regulation 23A(2) of Government 
Gazette No 38557(13-03-2015). 
60 Ibid. 
61 Vessio “Beware the provider of reckless credit” 2009 TSAR 274 277.  
62 Ibid.  
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affordability assessment.63 In the case of Absa Bank Ltd v Kganakga64 the court held that “the 
consumer should be asked to disclose her own history insofar as she has previously utilized 
credit and the manner in which that was handled by any civil judgments in money taken against 
the consumer”.65 This duty will be fulfilled adequately if the consumer answers truthfully all the 
information required by the credit provider, hence the credit provider’s questions must be 
relevant for the assessment. Therefore, it can be said that the accuracy of the pre-agreement 
assessment will depend on the information provided by the consumer.66   
The duty of a credit provider is to conduct a pre-agreement assessment fully and accurately.67 
The pre-agreement assessment by the credit provider must explore three main aspects:  
• the consumer’s general understanding of the risks, costs, and obligations under the credit 
agreement;  
• the consumer’s existing financial means, prospects and obligations; and  
• the consumer’s debt repayment history. 68   
The duty on the credit provider is fulfilled when all the aspects of the pre-agreement assessment 
have been critically assessed and the credit provider took reasonable steps to assess them.69 The 
credit provider who took reasonable steps to conduct the pre-agreement assessment will be 
protected from any liability for reckless credit by section 81(4) of the NCA.70 Section 81(4) of 
the NCA provides that it is a complete defence to an allegation of reckless credit if the credit 
provider establishes that the consumer failed to fully and truthfully answer any requests for 
information made by the credit provider, as part of the assessment required by this section. A 
court must determine whether the consumer’s failure to disclose all the required information 
                                               
63 Vessio (n 61) 279 and Regulation 24A(6) of the Government Gazette No 38557 (13-03-2015). 
64 Absa Bank Limited v Kganakga case no 26467/2012 (ZAGPJHC) (unreported).  
65 Absa Bank Limited v Kganakga (n 64) par 26.  
66 Vessio (n 61) 278.  
67 Vessio (n 61) 279. 
68 Section 81 of the NCA and Kelly-Louw and Stoop (n 15) 297 298. 
69 Vessio (n 61) 280. 
70 Vessio (n 61) 280 and Section 81(4) of the NCA. 
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materially affected the ability of the credit provider to make a proper assessment.71 The omission 
or the failure of the consumer to provide information would be material in instances where the 
credit provider would have never granted the credit or have granted an increase in terms of 
section 119(4) of the Act if that information was made available to that credit provider.72  
In the case of Horwood v Firstrand Bank73 the court developed two requirements which must be 
met for the defence in terms of section 81(4) to succeed. First, the credit provider must have 
conducted a proper pre-agreement assessment by taking “reasonable steps to assess” the 
consumer’s creditworthiness. 74 Secondly, the failure of the consumer to provide information 
materially affected the decision of the credit provider.75 In addition to this, Meyer J stated that 
“the correct interpretation of these provisions is that where a credit provider has taken the 
required  
‘reasonable steps to assess’ the relevant matters referred to in section 81(2), the credit agreement 
is not a reckless one in terms of section 80(1), whether or not the assessment was tainted by a 
consumer’s incomplete or untruthful answers.”76  In the case of Absa Bank v COE Family Trust77 
it was stated that section 81(4) of the NCA gives the credit provider a complete defence to the 
allegations of reckless lending, however, if the assessment was not taken in the first place then 
section 81(4) finds no application.78  
2.5 Types of reckless credit agreements  
The NCA created three instances whereby the conclusion of a credit agreement would be 
reckless.79 The court or tribunal making the determination of whether the credit agreement under 
dispute is reckless would have to assess the circumstances that existed at the time the reckless 
                                               
71 Kelly-Louw (n 43) 26.   
72 Vessio (n 61) 275 and Kelly-Louw and Stoop (n 15) 303 304. 
73 Horwood v Firstrand Bank Ltd case no 2010/36853 (ZAGPJHC) (unreported). 
74 Horwood v Firstrand Bank Ltd (n 73) par 7. 
75 Horwood v Firstrand Bank Ltd (n 73) par 7.  
76 Horwood v Firstrand Bank Ltd (n 73) par 7. 
77 Absa Bank v COE Family Trust 2012 3 SA 183 (WCC).  
78 Otto and Otto (n 40) 85 and Absa Bank v COE Family Trust (n 77) above. 
79 Van Heerden and Boraine “The money or the box: Perspective on reckless credit in terms of the National Credit 
Act 34 of 2005” 2011 De Jure 394 399.  
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credit agreement was concluded.80 The first category is provided for in section 80(1)(a) of the 
NCA which provides that credit extended to the consumer would be reckless where the credit 
provider failed to conduct a pre-agreement assessment into the financial position of the 
consumer, irrespective of the outcome of such assessment.81 This type of credit agreement is 
reckless automatically, as the assessment is essential in order to establish whether the consumer 
can afford the credit and understands all the risks and costs associated with the credit 
agreement.82 The purpose of this is to prevent credit providers from exploiting vulnerabilities by 
simply accepting an apparently creditworthy consumer on face value.83 
This type of credit agreement would be reckless even if it can be proven at a later stage that the 
consumer has the financial means to afford the credit and an assessment would have confirmed 
this. The fact that the consumer can afford the credit cannot change the credit agreement deemed 
to automatically be reckless. This type of conduct by the credit provider is inexcusable and 
grossly negligent.84 In De Paul Albert v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd85 it was alleged that 
the credit extended to the consumer was reckless as no pre-agreement assessment was conducted 
to establish if the consumer could afford the repayments on the loan.86 Furthermore, the credit 
provider would not be able to rely on any other remedy in terms of the NCA where he failed to 
conduct the assessment.87   
The second category of reckless credit is provided for in section 80(1)(b)(i) of the NCA which 
provides that credit is reckless if the credit provider fails to assess the consumer’s general 
understanding of  the risks and costs of the proposed credit and of the rights and obligations of 
the consumer under the credit agreement.88 Thus it imposes a duty on the credit provider to fully 
inform the consumer about all the information relating to the credit agreement. Regulation 
23A(15) provides that the credit provider must fully disclose to the consumer the credit cost 
                                               
80 Section 80(2) of the NCA and Kelly-Louw (n 43) 32. 
81 Stoop (n 4) 368.  
82 Brits “The National Credit Act’s remedies for reckless credit in the mortgage context” 2018 PERLJ 1 7. 
83 Vessio (n 61) 281. 
84 Vessio (n 61) 281. 
85 De Paul Albert v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd case no 21841/14 (ZAGPPHC) (unreported).  
86 De Paul Albert v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd (n 85) par 4. 
87 Vessio (n 61) 290.  
88 Section 81(2)(i) of the NCA and Kelly-Louw and Stoop (n 15) 297 298. 
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multiple and total costs of the credit in the pre-agreement statement and quotation.89 The credit 
providers who inform their consumers fully about the proposed credit agreement usually 
maximize their chances that the debt owed to them would be repaid and the consumer would 
fulfill their obligations under the proposed agreement.90 This is based on the fact that consumers 
who conclude agreements having been informed fully, usually choose the outcomes that would 
benefit them and reduce unnecessary cost of credit which they cannot handle and further these 
consumers clearly understand their obligations in terms of the agreement.91   
The last category of reckless credit is provided for in section 80(1)(b)(ii) of the NCA. This 
section provides that a credit agreement is reckless where the credit provider entered into a credit 
agreement with the consumer despite the fact that the preponderance of the information available 
indicated that entering into that credit agreement would over-indebt the consumer.92 It may be 
established during the pre-agreement assessment that the consumer understands the risks and 
obligations under the proposed agreement, however credit agreements which would over-indebt a 
consumer are reckless in nature.93   
The major concern regarding extending credit to a consumer who is likely to became over-
indebted is that these consumers are highly vulnerable to becoming over-indebted in the near 
future.94 This  shift would occur when a consumer who is highly indebted experiences an adverse 
external market shock such as the loss of employment, resulting in the consumer being unable to 
meet his financial obligations. 95  The NCA was established to ensure that when the credit 
provider extends credit to their consumers, it is done so in a manner which would allow the 
consumer to be able to service their debt despite experiencing external market shock.96   
In the case of SA Securitization v Mbatha97 the court stated that:   
                                               
89 Stoop (n 4) 368.  
90 Stoop (n 4) 369.  
91 Stoop (n 4) 370.  
92 Section 80(1)(b)(ii) of the NCA.  
93 Ibid. 
94 De Wet, Botha & Booyens (n 1) 85.  
95 De Wet, Botha & Booyens (n 1) 85. 
96 De Wet, Botha & Booyens (n 1) 86 87.  
97 SA Securitization v Mbatha 2011 1 SA 310 (GSJ).  
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“where a consumer is over-indebted, the creditor providers prospects of recovering from 
the consumer are often effectively limited to the recovery of the creditor’s security. If 
lenders are unable to recover deteriorating security, such as motor cars, promptly the 
consequences would be economically disastrous for asset-based lenders, especially those 
lending to the less affluent. It would have the effect of reducing available credit and 
pushing up the cost of credit for those consumers who are performing their obligations. 
Taking these practical factors into account is part of balancing the interests of credit 
providers and consumers”.98  
Section 79(1) of the NCA provides that a consumer is over-indebted if the preponderance of 
available information at the time a determination is made indicates that a consumer is or will be 
unable to satisfy in a timely manner all the obligations under all the credit agreements to which 
the consumer is a party, having regard to that consumer’s:  
(a) financial means, prospects and obligations; and  
(b) probable propensity to satisfy in a timely manner all the obligations under all the 
credit agreements to which the consumer is a party, as indicated by the consumer’s 
history of debt repayment.99  
In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Panayiotts100 it was held by the court that “financial 
means” includes not only income and expenses but also the consumer’s assets and liabilities.101 
Prospects include prospects of improvements to the consumer's financial position, such as 
increases and even liquidating assets. The court went further, holding that in the case of an 
installment agreement, secured loan, lease or mortgage agreement the consumer’s financial 
means and prospects would include the prospect of selling the goods in order to reduce his 
indebtedness.102  
2.6 Conducting the pre-agreement assessment  
                                               
98 SA Securitization v Mbatha (n 97) par 35.  
99 Section 79 (1) of the National Credit Act.  
100 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Panayiotts 2009 3 SA 363 (W).  
101 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Panayiotts (n 100) par 9.  
102 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Panayiotts (n 100) par 10.  
      19  
  
At the heart of the reckless credit provisions is the fact that the credit provider may not enter into 
a credit agreement without conducting the pre-agreement assessment with their consumer.103 
This pre-agreement assessment must assess the consumer’s understanding of the risks and costs 
of the proposed credit and the consumer’s rights and obligations under the agreement. The 
assessment must also probe into the financial means, prospects and obligations of the consumer, 
enquire into the debt repayment history of the consumer and lastly, where the purpose of 
applying for credit is to fund a commercial venture, the credit provider must also assess whether 
there is reasonable basis to conclude that the commercial purpose would be successful.104 
The credit provider may determine for itself the evaluative mechanisms and models to be used in 
meeting its assessment obligations under section 81, provided that any such mechanisms or 
models results in a fair and objective assessment.105 Furthermore, these evaluative assessment 
mechanisms or models, may not unfairly discriminate against people on one or more of the listed 
grounds found in section 9(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.106 
Therefore, where the credit provider’s evaluative methods or mechanisms have been found to be 
unfair and subjective then that credit provider will be compelled to use the Affordability 
Assessment Regulations determined by the Minister.107   
2.6.1 The consumer’s understanding of the risks and obligations under the proposed 
credit agreement  
The credit provider may not in terms of section 81 of the NCA enter into the credit agreement 
with a consumer who does not understand the nature of the credit agreement, risks and the costs 
associated with the credit agreement. 108  The credit provider must expressly inform their 
consumer of the risks, costs, and obligations under the credit agreement. The credit provider may 
include a clause or notice in the credit agreement to this effect.109 This clause or notice must be 
in plain language and must state that the credit provider has explained to the prospective 
                                               
103 Stoop and Kelly-Louw “The National Credit Act regarding suretyships and reckless lending” 2011 PELJ 67 86. 
104 Section 81(2) of the NCA and Stoop and Kelly-Louw (n 103) 85.  
105 Section 82(1) of the National Credit Act.  
106 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
107 Section 82(1) of the NCA and Van Heerden and Boraine (n 79) 398.  
108 Absa Bank v Kganakga (n 64) 25 and Section 81(2)(a)(i) of the NCA. 
109 Vessio (n 61) 279. 
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consumer the effect of the credit, the risks and costs of the credit and the consumer’s rights and 
obligations under that agreement. 110  This disclosure by the credit provider would allow the 
consumer to make an informed decision on the proposed credit.111   
In the case of Absa Bank v Kganakga112 the court stated that   
“what springs to mind is that the credit grantor must take reasonable steps to assess that 
the proposed consumer understands and appreciates what is meant by credit, by a loan, 
what it means to pay in installments, what the penalties are for failure to make payment 
of an installment, what is the concept of interest and that it may be calculated on the full 
amount of credit which remains and how it is calculated and at what rate.  The credit 
grantor should ensure that the proposed consumer understands that there are risks 
associated with failure to pay interest or capital or an installment at all or timeously”.113  
 
2.6.2 The debt repayment history of a consumer  
During the pre-agreement assessment, the credit provider must also check the debt repayment 
history of the consumer with the credit bureau. This would give the credit provider a better 
understanding of whether the consumer is a diligent payer or not.114 The basis is that a consumer 
who has bad repayment histories, may expose the credit provider to some risk.115 This is also an 
indication that the consumer is unable to manage their financial obligations, as a result, such a 
consumer would be over-indebted in the near future.116  
2.6.3 The consumer’s financial means, prospects, and obligations under the proposed 
credit agreement  
                                               
110 Vessio (n 61) 279. 
111 Vessio (n 61) 279. 
112 Absa Bank v Kganakga (n 64) par 25.  
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Section 81(2)(a)(iii) of the NCA provides that a credit provider must not enter into a credit 
agreement without first taking reasonable steps to assess the existing financial means, prospects, 
and obligations of the prospective consumer. The purpose of this is for the credit provider to 
establish whether the consumer will have the financial means to afford the credit. This is done by 
calculating the discretionary income of the prospective consumer.  The discretionary income of 
the consumer is calculated in the following way, firstly the credit provider must first establish the 
gross income of that consumer,117 secondly, the credit provider must subtract from the gross 
income all the statutory deductions such as income tax, unemployment insurance fund 
contributions, maintenance payments, necessary expenses and less all other committed payment 
obligations disclosed by the consumer, including such as may appear from the consumer’s credit 
records held by the credit bureau, the income remaining will be available to fund the proposed 
credit instalment.118 The methods which the credit provider could use to ascertain the gross 
income of the consumer were prescribed in terms of Regulation 23A(4) of the Affordability 
Assessment Regulations, however, these methods were declared invalid by the court in the 
Truworths Ltd v Minister of Trade and Industry.119 
In the Truworths case, the applicants are three of the largest retail clothing companies in South 
Africa, namely Truworths Ltd, Foschini Group and Mr Price Ltd. Their consumers purchase their 
goods with cash and credit in the form of store cards. The applicants instituted an application to 
invalidate regulations 23A(4), (5) and (7) of the Affordability Assessment Regulations. This 
application was opposed by the Minister of Trade and Industry and the National Credit 
Regulator. The Western Cape High court, in this case, invalidated only regulation 23A(4) of the 
Affordability Assessment regulation, which provided the methods to be used by the credit 
provider in obtaining the gross income of the consumer. Engers J stated that the prescribed form 
of validation in regulation 23A(4) is inappropriate and impossible to comply with for persons 
who are largely the poorer and less privileged members of the society. The court further held that 
                                               
117 Regulation 1 of Government Gazette No 38557 (13-03-2015). 
118 Ibid.  
119 Truworths Limited and Others v Minister of Trade and Industry 2018 3 SA 558 (WCC). 
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this regulation discriminates against consumers without bank accounts, and those who are 
informally or self- employed.120  
The court refrained from invalidating regulation 23A(5) and (7) as being inconsistent with the 
Constitution and the NCA because these regulations still highlight to a large extent the duty of a 
credit provider to conduct the affordability assessment and importance of conducting an accurate 
assessment by the credit provider. These regulations ensure that the credit provider conducts an 
accurate assessment of the financial position and that the information received is authentic. The 
court stated that “in order to avoid reckless credit being given (or obtained) I find no reason why 
the regulations should not contain provisions ensuring as far as possible that the assessment 
carried on by the credit provider is based on accurate information”.121 These regulations are very 
important to our credit market as they allow the credit provider to still fulfill their statutory duty 
under section 80 of the NCA to prevent reckless credit. This is in line with Section 3(1)(g) of the 
NCA which provides that in addition to providing accessible credit to all South Africans, it also 
aims to eradicate reckless credit and over-indebtedness of consumers, by providing mechanisms 
for resolving over-indebtedness based on the principle of satisfaction by the consumer of all 
responsible financial obligations.122  
As a result of this judgement the National Credit Regulator in May 2018 intervened and 
published guidelines on how credit providers may ascertain the consumer’s gross income, to be 
able to calculate the discretionary income of the consumer.123 It is provided that the gross income 
of the consumer shall be obtained in three ways:  
• Where the consumer is employed in the formal sector of the economy, their gross income 
would be obtained from their pay slips and where they do not receive pay slips, and their 
gross income is deposited into the bank account of the consumer, then the consumer’s 
bank statements for the preceding 3 months should be enough proof of their gross 
income.124  
                                               
120 Truworths Limited and Others v Minister of Trade and Industry and Others (n 119) par 47.     
121 Truworths Limited and Others v Minister of Trade and Industry and Others (n 119) par 58.  
122 Section 3 of the NCA.  
123 Government Gazzette 41604 (04-05-2018).  
124 Government Gazzette (n 123) 25. 
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• Where the consumer has held employment for less than three months, they may produce 
their most recent income statement, a letter of employment from their employer or a 
recent bank statement displaying the salary deposit.125 
• Where a consumer is self-employed, employed in the informal sector, or receives income 
other than from formal employment, the credit provider will then be required to conduct 
its own credit affordability assessment according to its own methods, such methods must 
be pre-approved by the National Credit Regulator.126   
Therefore, the duty of the credit provider to assess the consumer before extending credit to the 
consumer was not extinguished by the invalidation of regulation 23A(4). The credit provider still 
has the duty to ascertain the consumer’s gross income and discretionary income and they still 
have to conduct the affordability assessment on any credit application.127 Regulation 23A(10) 
provides the method to be used by the credit provider in conducting the affordability assessment. 
First, the credit provider must ascertain the gross income of the consumer using any of the 
methods prescribed by the National Credit Regulator above. 128 Secondly, the credit provider 
must deduct from the gross income of the consumer, the statutory deductions and minimum 
living expenses of that consumer to arrive at the net income.129 Thirdly, from the net income, the 
credit provider must deduct the consumer's existing debt obligations. The amount remaining 
would be the discretionary income, which is available to satisfy the new debt.130  
The accuracy of the assessment will depend on the ability of the consumer to fully and truthfully 
answer any requests for information made by the credit provider in their assessment.131 Failure to 
do so by the consumer would exempt the credit provider from any liability for reckless credit 
under the NCA, provided that this failure materially affected the credit provider in conducting 
their assessment.132 Regulation 23A(7) seeks to ensure that the information provided by the 
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consumer is true and authentic. 133  Where a reckless credit agreement was concluded such 
agreement is not void and unlawful, and the courts have the power to determine the effect of that 
agreement.134  
2.6.4 Commercial venture of applying for credit   
Where the credit agreement application is solely for the fulfilment of a commercial venture, the 
credit provider must further assess “if there are reasonable basis to conclude any commercial 
purpose may prove to be successful”.135 The court in Wiese and Another v Absa Bank Ltd136 
stated that the purpose of the loan determines what needs to be considered in the pre-agreement 
assessment and not the type of loan requested.137 Therefore, the pre-agreement assessment which 
enquires into the success or prospects of the business venture would still be considered regardless 
of the type of loan taken by the consumer to fund the business or commercial venture.138  
The court in Absa Bank Limited v De Beer and Others139 stated that in assessing whether the 
credit provider complied with their duty in section 81, the court must promote the stated purpose 
of the NCA reasonably.140 The court set aside the credit agreement with Absa Bank on the basis 
that there was no evidence that the pre-agreement assessment was conducted by the credit 
provider, as the documents could not be produced at the proceedings. 141  Therefore the 
significance of the Absa case proves that the credit provider will only be able to escape liability 
for reckless credit where he can prove to the court that he took reasonable steps to conduct the 
required pre-agreement assessment.  
2.7 Remedies for reckless credit agreements  
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Where the court has established that the credit provider’s conduct amounts to reckless lending, 
the court may make an order in terms of section 83 of the NCA.142 The determination of whether 
the credit granted was reckless, is to be made at the time the reckless credit agreement was 
concluded.143 Section 83(1) of the NCA provides that despite any provision of law or agreement 
to the contrary, in any court proceedings in which a credit agreement is being considered, the 
court may declare that the credit agreement is reckless, as determined in accordance with this 
Part.144 This section prescribes the powers to be exercised by the court with regards to the 
reckless credit agreement. The courts have no power to classify these agreements as unlawful 
because the reckless credit agreements are not included in the list of unlawful credit agreements 
in section 89.145 
 Section 130(4)(a) of the NCA determines that if during any proceedings involving debt and that 
court established that the credit agreement was reckless, then the court “must” make one of the 
orders in section 83 pertaining to the reckless credit remedies.146 This suggests that the court has 
no discretion to deviate from the powers granted in section 83 and that it can make no order other 
than those provided for in that section.147 The consumer alleging reckless credit by the credit 
provider must be able to prove these allegations on a balance of probabilities, thus the mere 
allegation of reckless credit would not be sufficient to declare the agreement reckless.148   
2.7.1 Remedy for reckless credit agreements in terms of sections 80(1)(a) and 80(1)(b)(i) of the 
National Credit Act 
Section 83(2) of the NCA provides that if a court declares that a credit agreement is reckless due 
to the credit provider not conducting the pre-agreement assessment and/or at the time of 
concluding the agreement the consumer did not understand the risks, costs, and obligations of the 
proposed credit agreement, then the court must make an order in terms of this section.149 The 
                                               
142 Brits (n 82) 6. 
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court or tribunal has the discretion to make an order in the following aspect, setting aside all or 
part of the consumer’s rights and obligations under that agreement, as the court determines just 
and reasonable in the circumstances or the court may make an order suspending the effect of that 
credit agreement in accordance with subsection (3)(b)(i). 150  The NCA gave the courts a 
discretion to choose which one of the orders they would exercise in these instances, such 
discretion is confined to the orders prescribed in section 83(2) of the NCA.151 These orders can 
only be made with reference to a particular credit agreement which forms part of the dispute 
before the court.152  
2.7.1.1 Setting aside the reckless credit agreement  
The court or tribunal upon establishing that the credit agreement was, in fact, reckless, may set 
such an agreement aside. With regards to setting the reckless credit agreement aside, Van 
Heerden and Boraine provide that where the performance in terms of the agreement has not yet 
occurred, it would be reasonable in these circumstances for the court to set such a credit 
agreement aside.153 Where the performance in terms of the credit agreement has already occurred 
then the court must first decide whether the property which formed part of that reckless credit 
agreement should be returned or not.154  
Where performance had already been given in terms of that credit agreement, the performance 
must be returned because this type of agreement is lawful in terms of section 89.155 The parties 
must maintain status-quo. Hence, the parties would have to return the property to each other.156 
This view is confirmed by section 25(1) of the Constitution, 157 which prohibits the arbitrary 
deprivation of property; this section can be a useful tool to help evaluate the nature, effects, and 
limits of the reckless credit remedies.158 Therefore, it can be submitted that where the credit 
agreement is declared to be reckless and subsequently set aside then the consumer would be 
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expected to return the property that formed part of that agreement to the credit provider and the 
credit provider would be expected to relieve that consumer of the obligations under the credit 
agreement.159   
2.7.1.2 Suspending the reckless credit agreement  
The court in considering to suspend the reckless credit agreement in terms of section 83(4) of the 
NCA must consider the consumer’s current financial obligations that existed at the time the 
agreement was made and the expected date when any such obligation under the credit agreement 
will be fully satisfied assuming the consumer makes all required payment in accordance with any 
proposed order.160 During the suspension, the rights and obligations under the credit agreement 
temporarily stop, hence the interest, fees, and charges associated with the credit agreement may 
not be charged during such suspension, the result of which the credit provider would be at a 
loss.161   
During the suspension the credit provider will not be able to cancel the agreement or enforce the 
agreement, however where depreciable property forms part of the reckless credit agreement, it 
will usually be expected of the consumer to temporarily return the property to the credit 
provider.162 Section 81 does not entitle the consumer to keep possession of the property of the 
credit provider without paying for it, so if the consumer wants to use the property during 
suspension they will have to provide some security for their possession of the property.163 If it 
transpires that the use of the depreciable property by the consumer during suspension would 
cause irreparable harm to the credit provider, then he may be allowed to make an interim order to 
be allowed to secure the safekeeping of the property during the suspension. The court in these 
cases has the discretion to determine how they would go about allocating possession of the 
property which forms part of the subject of the credit agreement. 164 In order to do justice 
between the parties the courts usually order that the consumer return the depreciable property 
forming part of the dispute to the credit provider during the suspension. At the end of the 
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suspension period, the rights and obligations under the credit agreement fully revive and are 
enforceable.165  
In the case of SA Taxi Securitization v Mbatha166 the court stated that:  
“It seems unlikely that the legislature ever intended that the consumer could keep the 
‘money and the box’. If the consumer obtained possession and use of a motor vehicle in 
circumstances in which no credit should have been extended to the consumer, it would be 
fundamentally unfair and counterproductive for the consumer to continue to use the 
vehicle while at the same time not making any payments under the agreement.”167  
2.7.2 Remedy for reckless credit agreements in terms of section 80(1)(b)(ii) of the National 
Credit Act  
Section 83(3) of the NCA provides that if a court declares that a credit agreement is reckless in 
terms of section 80(1)(b)(ii), the court further consider  whether the consumer is over-indebted at 
the time of those court proceedings and if the court concludes that the consumer is over-indebted, 
the court may make an order suspending the reckless credit agreement and restructure that 
consumer’s obligations under any other credit agreement. The court must first, consider whether 
the consumer was over-indebted at the time of the court proceedings.168 Therefore, the court 
must reconsider the consumer's means and their ability to meet the financial obligations as they 
already existed at the time the agreement was concluded.169 Secondly, if the court has established 
that the consumer was indeed  over-indebted at the time of the proceedings, the court must make 
an order suspending the reckless credit agreement and restructuring all the credit obligations of 
the consumer under any credit agreement.170  
2.7.2.1 Suspending the credit agreement for over-indebted consumers  
The National Credit Act aims to penalize credit providers who extend credit to consumers 
without first conducting a pre-agreement assessment; extended credit to the consumer who does 
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not understand the risks, costs or obligations under the proposed credit agreement and to 
consumers who would as a result of that credit agreement extended become over-indebted.171 
Section 83 (3) provides that if a court declares that a credit agreement is reckless in terms of 
section 80(1)(b)(ii), the court must further consider whether the consumer is over-indebted at the 
time of the court proceedings and if the court concludes that the consumer is over-indebted, the 
court may make an order suspending the force and effect of the credit agreement until a date 
determined by the court when making the order of suspension and restructure the consumer’s 
obligations under any other credit agreement, in accordance with section 87. 
During the time that the force and effect of a credit agreement is suspended in terms of the Act 
the consumer is not required to make any payment required under the agreement, no interest, fees 
or other charge under the agreement may be charged to the consumer and the credit provider’s 
rights under the agreement, or under any law in respect of that agreement, are unenforceable, 
despite any law to the contrary.172 
Before suspending the credit agreement, the court or tribunal must conduct an assessment into 
the current means and the ability to pay the consumer’s financial obligations that existed at the 
time 
the agreement was made and the expected date when any such obligation under a credit 
agreement will be fully satisfied, assuming the consumer makes all required payments in 
accordance with 
any proposed order, this is so to establish what the effect of the suspension will be on the 
consumer’s obligations. 173  The purpose of this remedy is to provide temporary relief for 
consumers, with the hope that during such a suspension the consumer may attempt to remedy 
their financial position. 174  By suspending the credit agreement, the creditor will forfeit any 
interest, fees, and charges which the credit provider would have otherwise made, had it not been 
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for the suspension.175 This suspension should be able to give the consumer some time to recover 
financially and to later be able to start servicing their debt under the reckless credit agreement.176  
There are two types of over-indebtedness, the first type being where it was established during the 
pre-agreement assessment that the consumer is financially stable, as a result the credit agreement 
was concluded however this consumer only became over-indebted at a later stage.177 The second 
type being the instance when the consumer was over-indebted at the time where the credit 
agreement was concluded. This remedy is not aimed at punishing the credit provider who extends 
credit to a consumer who later becomes over-indebted but to punish those creditors who 
extended credit to already over-indebted consumers or are highly likely to became over-
indebted.178  
In SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Albert Campher179 the court held that “a defence based on 
the over-indebtedness of the debtor does not avail the consumer in circumstances where the 
creditor seeks the return of goods in which ownership vests in the creditor”.180 This principle was 
also stated in Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Panayiotts181 where the court stated that 
“in any event, my view is that the NCA does not envisage that a consumer may claim to be over-
indebted whilst at the same time retaining possession of the goods which form the subject matter 
of the agreement. Such goods should be sold to reduce the defendant’s indebtedness”. 182 
Therefore, it can also reasonably be expected that the consumer must return the property forming 
part of the reckless credit agreement in instances where the obligations are suspended.183   
2.7.2.2 Restructuring credit agreement  
After the court or tribunal has suspended the obligations of the consumer under the reckless 
credit agreement, they must restructure the consumer’s obligations. Where the debt counselor 
establishes that the consumer was over-indebted by or at the time the reckless credit agreement 
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was concluded, then the debt counselor must issue a proposal recommending the Magistrate’ 
court to make an order in terms of section 86(7)(c) of the NCA.184 The debt counselor may 
recommend the Magistrate’s court to make one of the following orders, to rearrange the 
consumer’s obligation by:  
o extending the period of the agreement and reducing the amount of each payment 
due accordingly;  
o postponing during a specified period the dates on which payments are due under 
the agreement;  
o extending the period of the agreement and postponing during a specified period the 
dates on which payments are due under the agreement; or  
o recalculating the consumer's obligations because of the contravention. 185  
The effect of the re-arrangement would be that the consumer may not incur further charges under 
the reckless credit agreement and the credit provider may not be able to enforce the agreement 
during the re-arrangement.186   
3. CHAPTER THREE: THE NATIONAL CREDIT AMENDMENT BILL 2017  
On 24 November 2017 the portfolio committee on Trade and Industry published the draft 
National Credit Amendment Bill.187 The purpose of the Bill is to extensively regulate the credit 
market by including an evaluation and referral of debt intervention applications and to regulate 
the duties of other credit providers in reckless credit agreements.188 The Bill seeks to achieve two 
aspects, first, it criminalizes reckless credit granting by the credit providers, and extends the duty 
to prevent and report cases of reckless credit agreements to any credit provider who might come 
across a reckless credit agreement while conducting the pre-agreement assessment as 
                                               
184 Section 87 of the NCA and Kelly-Louw and Stoop (n 15) 307 308. 
185 Section 86(7)(c)(ii) of the NCA.  
186 Section 84(1) of the NCA and Brits (n 82).   
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contemplated in section 81 of the NCA.189 Secondly, the Bill introduces a new form of debt 
intervention for low-income consumers with the aim of addressing over-indebtedness.190  
3.1 Reckless credit under the National Credit Amendment Bill 2017  
Section 82A(1) of the Bill provides that if a credit provider during an assessment contemplated in 
section 81(2) of the NCA reasonably suspects any credit agreement included in that assessment 
as being a reckless credit agreement, that credit provider must report that suspected reckless 
credit agreement to the National Credit Regulator.191 In addition where the alleged reckless credit 
agreement was concluded by the credit provider conducting the assessment then that credit 
provider must report themselves to the National Credit Regulator.192 Therefore, by extending the 
duty to prevent reckless credit to other credit providers this ensures that where the credit provider 
notices reckless conduct by other credit providers they report such conduct.193   
Although this Bill extends the protection offered to consumers against reckless credit and over-
indebtedness, the disadvantage is that it places an unbearable burden on the credit provider to 
prevent reckless credit. It requires the credit provider conducting the assessment to report a 
suspected reckless credit agreement, however, it does not expressly provide how the credit 
provider should go about establishing that.194 The credit provider would not at any time during 
the assessment have the relevant information about the suspected reckless credit provider to 
make the determination. The required information for the determination of whether the suspected 
credit agreement was reckless, includes copies of the credit agreement, the pre-agreement 
statements, the date on which the credit was approved, copies of the affordability assessment and 
income statements at the time of the conclusion of the agreement.195  
In addition to the challenge of access to the credit information required by the debt counselor to 
investigate reckless credit, they would also face several other challenges. First, since the debt 
                                               
189 Government Gazette No 41274 (n 184). 
190 Van Heerden and Steennot (n 48) 6. 
191 Section 82A (1) of the Amendment Bill. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Debt Counsellors Association of South Africa “Comments by DCASA on the Draft National Credit Amended 
Bill” 2018 http: www//debtfreedigi.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/DCASA_Draft-National-Credit-
AmendmentBill-2017-Comments-by-DCASA-Fina....pdf (07-10-2018) 1 19.  
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counselor will not be paid to report the suspected reckless credit, there is no incentive for the 
debt counselor to do such.196 Secondly, where the request was made by the debt counselor on the 
information to conduct the investigation into the reckless credit agreement, a credit provider may 
delay providing the information with the knowledge that the application can only be made within 
60 business days after establishing that the credit agreement is reckless, and no sanction was put 
in place to ensure the credit provider will not delay the application.197 Lastly, the credit provider 
may oppose the application in court with the knowledge that the debt counselor is not paid for 
opposing applications thus they would defend their findings at their own expense, with the risk 
that a cost order may be made against them.198  
The consequences of the credit provider who fails to comply with the Bill are provided for in 
section 157B(1)(d) of the Bill. Section 157B(1)(d) of the Bill provides that the credit provider 
who fails to comply with section 81(2) of the NCA by entering into a reckless credit agreement 
with a prospective consumer commits an offense.199 The Tribunal may impose a fine on the 
credit provider or the debt counselor who failed to report the suspected reckless credit 
agreement. 200  This also ensures that credit providers and/or the debt counselors act as 
“regulators” to the credit providers who conduct their affairs recklessly, even though the 
consumer has not yet reported the credit agreement as reckless. It is argued that the two sections 
could potentially be unconstitutional as it violates the privilege against self-incrimination as 
stipulated in section 35 of the Constitution, as it compels credit providers to report themselves 
where they had concluded a reckless credit agreement.201   
3.2 Remedies for reckless credit under the Amendment Bill  
Section 82A(5) of the Bill provides that if the National Credit Regulator is reasonably of the 
view that a credit agreement reported to it as contemplated in subsections (1) and (2) is a reckless 
credit agreement, the National Credit Regulator must issue a notice to the affected credit provider 
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in the prescribed form suspending the reckless credit agreement and refer the reckless credit 
agreement to the Tribunal for a declaration contemplated in section 83.202 Since the regulator is 
not an adjudicative body it would not be allowed to suspend a credit agreement. It is provided by 
the Banking Association of South Africa that this provision is unconstitutional as it violates the 
provision of section 33(1) of the Constitution which provides for the right to procedural fairness 
and the right to property as provided in section 25 of the Constitution.203   
3.3 Debt intervention in terms of the Amendment Bill  
The second aspect of the National Credit Amendment Bill dealing with debt intervention was 
introduced to create a new form of debt intervention for over-indebted consumers. Section 1 of 
the Bill provides that debt intervention means a measure as contemplated in section 86A, which 
aims to assist identified consumers for whom existing natural person insolvency measures are not 
accessible in practice.204 This type of intervention would reduce or completely extinguish the 
debts owed by qualifying consumers.205 In order for an individual to qualify for such relief, they 
would have to comply with the following requirements:  
a. applicants must be South African citizens or permanent resident and they must be 
natural persons at the time of the applications;  
b. applicants must receive no form of income or the income received on an average of 6 
months does not exceed R 7500 per month;  
c. the applicant has not realizable assets, which they may be able to exchange for cash;   
d. the applicant is not subject to debt review under section 86;  
e. the applicants may be a disabled person, minor headed household or women headed 
household. 206  
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Once a person complies with all the requirements, they may apply to the National Credit 
Regulator in the prescribed manner and form for debt intervention, if the applicant has at 24 
November 2017, a total unsecured debt owing to credit providers of no more than R 50000.207  
4 CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS    
In conclusion, this minor dissertation has established the importance of a pre-agreement 
assessment in section 81 of the NCA as a measure that is used to prevent reckless credit and 
over-indebtedness. This dissertation has established the measures to be taken by the credit 
provider in order to avoid concluding any of the three types of reckless credit agreements. This 
assessment ensures that the consumer understands the risks, costs, and obligations to be 
associated with the agreement before they bind themselves to that credit agreement. Secondly, 
the pre-agreement assessment will also ensure that the credit provider does not conclude a credit 
agreement with a consumer who would become over-indebted as a result of that credit 
agreement, and as a result be unable to meet their financial obligations in terms of the agreement.   
The credit provider must in order to escape liability for reckless credit conduct an accurate pre-
agreement assessment, by taking “reasonable steps to assess” the consumer. What would 
constitute reasonable steps will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The accuracy 
of the pre-agreement assessment will not only depend on the conduct of the credit provider but 
also on the conduct of the prospective consumer, as the consumer has to provide the credit 
provider with all the information requested and answer all the credit provider’s questions 
correctly and truthfully.   
The Affordability Assessment Regulations and the NCA provisions if applied correctly have the 
power to eradicate reckless credit and over-indebtedness in our economy. These provisions have 
built-in measures to prevent abuse of power by either the credit provider or consumer. The NCA 
has measures to remedy reckless credit and over-indebtedness in section 83, in cases where it is 
established that the credit agreement was reckless, then the court or tribunal must make one of 
the orders contemplated in section 83 of the NCA. Furthermore, the legislature by enacting the 
                                               
207 Section 82 of Government Gazette No 41274 (24-11-2017).  
      36  
  
National Credit Amendment Bill will be enforcing further deterrence measures for credit 
providers who grant reckless credit.  
The National Credit Amendment Bill extends protection to consumers, this is to further protect 
consumers from credit providers who might exploit them. The Bill creates criminal liability 
against credit providers who conclude reckless credit agreements with the consumers and credit 
providers who became aware that another credit provider concluded a reckless credit agreement 
with the consumer and fails to report the reckless conduct to the relevant authority.  The Bill 
further creates a debt intervention for over-indebted qualifying consumers. This will be against 
section 3 of the NCA which seeks to promote access to credit for all persons equally.208 
Therefore, the measures developed in terms of the NCA, the Affordability Assessment 
Regulations and the National Credit Amendment Bill, 2017 are sufficient to prevent reckless 
credit and over-indebtedness of the consumers, only if utilized correctly. The most important 
purpose of the NCA is fulfilled by the measures listed above, as the NCA grants access to credit 
for persons previously disadvantaged and excluded from the credit market.209 Furthermore, these 
measures attempt to prevent the endless cycle of credit dependent consumers, thus protecting all 
consumer and enhancing economic growth.210 The NCA allows the credit provider to develop 
their own pre-agreement assessment methods provided that they are objective and fair, hence the 
credit provider may implement stricter methods which may prevent access to credit, in an 
attempt to protect their own property.211 
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